International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of Firms by Tor Eriksson & Niels Westergaard-Nielsen
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research
Volume Title:  International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of 
Firms 
Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Kathryn L. Shaw, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26194-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/free07-1
Conference Date: January 2006
Publication Date: September 2009
Chapter Title:  Productivity Differences in an International Pharmaceutical Firm     
Chapter Author:  Tor Eriksson, Niels Westergaard-Nielsen 
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0444
Chapter pages in book: (p. 173 - 192)173
6.1    Introduction
The diﬀerences in productivity growth between the United States and 
Europe since the early 1990s have been explained by diﬀerences in the speed 
of adopting the new information and communication technologies and in 
making full use of the new technologies (see, e.g., Feldstein [2003], van Ark, 
O’Mahoney, and Timmer [2008]). The argument is that in order to fully 
exploit the possibilities to enhance productivity with the help of the new 
information and communication technologies, implementation of the latter 
have to be accompanied by changes in work organizations and practices: 
decentralized decision making, more teamworking, and jobs with broader 
skills. Thus, higher rates of adoption of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and, hence, stronger productivity growth in the United 
States has been facilitated by the less regulated American labor markets, 
which make it easier to implement the changes in work organizations that, 
combined with ICT, elevate productivity. Another factor reinforcing the 
diﬀerence between the two continents are the stronger management incen-
tives in U.S. ﬁ  rms, owing to the more widespread use of stock options, 
bonuses, and other incentive pay programs for managers. Naturally, there 
are also other factors that can have contributed to the increase in productiv-
ity, such as changed policy regime and deregulation of several markets, but 
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for an understanding of the U.S.-  Europe diﬀerential, diﬀerences in labor 
market regulations and institutions are the prime candidates. Following, 
we will provide some micro-  level evidence on this issue, making use of a 
cross-  country comparison of developments of a Danish and a U.S. plant 
within a single ﬁ  rm.
It should be noted, however, that from a general U.S.- Europe comparison 
perspective, Denmark has rather atypical labor market institutions and regu-
lations. In this respect Denmark is not a typical European country and as a 
matter of fact does not do a good job in representing the other Scandinavian 
countries either. A key characteristic of Danish industrial relations is the so- 
called “Danish model,” according to which many issues related to the labor 
market are regulated not by legislation, but by agreements between employ-
ers and their employees. This is true not only for wages, but for regulation 
of working time, employment protection, notiﬁ  cation of lay-  oﬀs, and so 
forth. However, the “Danish model” does not completely exclude regulation; 
legislation regulates holidays and work environment and safety, but these 
are exceptions. Another distinguishing feature of Danish labor markets is 
the combination of labor market ﬂ  exibility and income security, oftentimes 
called “ﬂ  exicurity.” Job security legislation is very liberal by European stan-
dards: there is no experience rating in the unemployment insurance system, 
the replacement ratios of the unemployment beneﬁ  ts are among the highest 
in the world, and most social insurance beneﬁ  ts, vacation rights, and pen-
sions are transferable across employers. Hence, costs of labor mobility are 
relatively low for both employers and employees.
Our analysis is also related to another recent literature on the importance 
of new work practices and new work organizations for corporate perfor-
mance; for a review, see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003). These studies point 
to ﬂ  attening of hierarchies, broadening and enrichment of job designs, 
increased functional ﬂ  exibility, teamwork, and empowerment of workers 
as sources of improving productivity. The idea behind many of the new 
work practices used is often the opposite of the traditional way of think-
ing in economics, according to which, ever since Adam Smith’s pin factory 
study, productivity improvements chieﬂ  y are thought of as arising from 
specialization.
Now, of course, nobody is claiming that the work practices and new pay-
ment systems associated with them or empowerment of workers always 
work to the beneﬁ  t of the ﬁ  rm. Thus, several studies conclude that in order 
for changes in work organizations to have profound eﬀects, they have to 
be bundled with changes in other practices (training, compensation, etc.); 
see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003). An important restriction on empowering 
workers is that proﬁ  tability is likely to decline before productivity stops 
improving (Freeman and Lazear 1995). Introduction of performance pay is 
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(Lazear 2000); other times abandoning performance pay and adoption of 
input-  based pay leads to better performance (Freeman and Kleiner 2005). 
Changes in information and communication technologies has indeed made 
it possible to decentralize the organization of ﬁ  rms, but can also enable ﬁ  rms 
to reduce their worker’s decision-  making authority and to monitor them 
more closely than before (Hubbard 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2007).
The lesson from the burgeoning literature on new workplace practices, 
empowerment of workers, and the impact of the new information and 
communication technologies seems to be that sometimes adopting them is 
good, but other times it is not. Thus, the conjecture that diﬀerences in the 
rate of adoption of new work organizations to support the introduction of 
information and communication technologies could explain diﬀerences in 
productivity does not necessarily follow.
6.2      The Firm and the Industry
The ﬁ  rm we are concerned with in the current study is a large multina-
tional ﬁ  rm in the pharmaceutical industry, the mother company of which 
is located in Denmark. For convenience, we henceforth call the ﬁ  rm AB. 
Internationally, this ﬁ  rm faces strong competition from three or four other 
producers, but so far AB has been quite successful. Thus, AB is considered 
as one of the big players in the market for the speciﬁ  c medicine it produces. 
The international market for the drug AB is producing is one of the fastest 
growing in the whole pharmaceutical industry. In Denmark AB is not only 
known for its successful performance during several years in a row, but is also 
widely considered to be among the best employers in the country because 
of its labor-  friendly policies. Furthermore, AB is known for its corporate 
social responsibility and its focus on environmental issues in particular. But 
also equal opportunity and concerns for work-  life balance are important 
elements of AB’s proﬁ  le. When AB has opened a production plant in a new 
country, it has to a large extent transferred the same company values to the 
new location. At the same time, AB has had to account for diﬀerences in the 
economic environment its plants are operating.
6.2.1    The  Production  Technology
All the raw material for the medicine is produced by a single AB fac-
tory located in Denmark and is delivered as a crystalline product to all the 
other AB plants in diﬀerent parts of the world. These plants in turn make 
diﬀerent dilutions of the crystals for diﬀerent products. This formulation, as 
it is called, is carried out in a separate unit at each production plant. In all 
plants there is still another unit where the ﬁ  lling process takes place. Each 
plant has a number of ﬁ  lling lines, which used to be plant-  speciﬁ  c; that is, 
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standardized ﬁ  lling machines that can be bought from manufacturers and 
can be adapted to the local circumstances.
Because of the strict regulations characterizing the pharmaceutical indus-
try, a considerable part of the processes have to be done in an antiseptic 
environment. This requires special building features as well as special train-
ing by workers. In the production of the medicine in our case ﬁ  rm, there 
are two antiseptic levels, and the workers have to meet certain qualiﬁ  cation 
requirements for working at both of them. It usually takes two years to take 
the tests that qualify the worker for the highest level of antiseptic work. 
The antiseptic requirements make the ﬁ  lling vulnerable to faulty techniques 
and hence, ﬁ  lling is much more complex and expensive than, for instance, 
beer bottling. Consequently, for the proﬁ  tability of the production process, 
maintaining high quality while simultaneously reducing operation time of 
machines and workers are key.
6.2.2    Regulation
In the two plants we are examining, the products are to be marketed in the 
U.S. market, and as a consequence, both the production of the raw material 
and the ﬁ  lling operations are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA). The regulation implies that there are strict requirements as to 
data collection, procedures, and employees’ awareness and knowledge about 
working in antiseptic environments. The FDA approval takes a long time to 
obtain, but is lost in a relatively short time and is, therefore, considered as 
one of the biggest assets in the industry; indeed, survival is conditional on 
it. Thus, production quality is crucial. In order to meet the FDA standards 
AB has to invest large resources in hiring and training the right people. Five 
to eight years ago, the main focus of the company’s strategy was on secur-
ing and maintaining the FDA approval. Thus, the major part of managerial 
resources was used on improving the quality aspects of production.
Today, the personnel are the single most important input in production of 
the drug since machinery and equipment for the ﬁ  lling lines can be bought 
on the market. Earlier, the ﬁ  lling lines were customer built; hence, a ﬁ  rm 
could compete on the quality side by design and construction of superior 
equipment. As this is no longer the case, improving productivity on the exist-
ing lines has become a central parameter of competition. The main vehicle 
in these eﬀorts at AB has been a reengineering project using the lean produc-
tion approach (henceforth referred to as the LEAN project). There are many 
tools in this process. Basically, it is the manner technicians and the ﬁ  lling staﬀ 
work together, the way teams are organized, what teams do when a member 
is absent, employee training, and the placement of working hours.
Where FDA regulations do not apply, national or EU authorities are 
performing similar regulations and controls. For our study it is important to 
notice that the FDA is applying the same standards to the two plants studied. 
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6.3      The Two Case Plants
The AB company has several production sites in Denmark, one plant in 
the United States, and a number of additional plants in a number of other 
countries. In our research reported following we have predominantly focused 
on the U.S. plant and the main Danish plant, which is the oldest plant in the 
ﬁ  rm. At a later stage it turned out to be easier to obtain comparable data 
from one of the other Danish plants, which also resembles the American 
plant in several respects. Thus, in section 6.4.2, we will also make use of some 
information from this other Danish plant.
The main production processes at the two plants studied are formulation 
and ﬁ  lling of the medicine. At the two plants the medicine is ﬁ  lled on two 
types of vials: a traditional one and a modern, easier- to- use vial, henceforth 
called P1 and P2, respectively. One thing the two plants have in common 
is that they both supply to the U.S. market. Consequently, also the Dan-
ish plant has to meet all the requirements of the FDA; in fact, the plant in 
Denmark is the only one within AB and outside the United States that is 
delivering the drug to the American drug market.
In order to understand how diﬀerences in productivity and eﬃciency over 
time as well as between plants arise, it is important to know what the sources of 
nonproduction are. Consider the operations of a ﬁ  lling during a week. Of the 
total 168 hours available for production a considerable part is not due to:
Maintenance of the equipment
Validation of equipment
Testing new products
Changeover and setup (that is, time between batch runs)
Cleaning
The proportion of the week when the equipment is not available for pro-
duction can easily be as high as 20 to 30 percent. Consequently, technologi-
cal and organizational changes that reduce the time the equipment is idle are 
crucial. Another reason for low productivity is interruptions in production, 
especially ﬁ  lling, which give rise to losses during operation. This form of 
downtime makes up a considerable proportion of the total time when the 
equipment is available for production. Finally, for total eﬃciency, quality of 
the products play a role as some part of the production during a batch will 
be scrapped because it does not meet the high antiseptic and other quality 
standards. Thus, reduction of losses due to nonavailability of equipment, 
losses during operation, and quality losses constitute important ways of 
improving productivity.
Although the two plants have many things in common, there are also some 
distinct diﬀerences. One is that the Danish plant has seven lines of ﬁ  lling sta-
tions while the U.S. plant only has four. Another diﬀerence is that the plant in 
the United States is operating around the clock with work organized in two 178    Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-  Nielsen
twelve- hour shifts, whereas in the plant in Denmark work is organized in two 
eight- hour shifts, with cleaning commencing after the second shift. The rea-
son for this is historical: the highest antiseptic level is in the middle of the old 
plant building and is physically located in a big room that has to be cleaned 
at the same time. The American plant is younger and built in such a way that 
there are four distinct lines that can be run and cleaned separately.
A third diﬀerence is that the Danish plant is also doing trial ﬁ  llings and 
is, therefore, frequently producing relatively small batches. The batch size 
is important not only because it aﬀects the frequency of changeovers, but 
also because the ﬁ  lling line always has to be cleaned between two batch runs. 
This is because regulation stipulates that one should be able to track each 
batch from the formulation to the ﬁ  nal product stage. This is not without 
consequences for how production can be organized and aﬀects operation 
times. Moreover, as the plant in Denmark is not working around the clock, 
a new, larger batch will not be started up if the previous batch is ﬁ  nished in 
the middle of the day. Instead, the time will be used for maintenance. We 
actually saw this happen when we visited the Danish plant. The consequence 
is that there will be downtime that cannot always be productively used. At 
the U.S. plant this problem seldom arises.
Because of the diﬀerences in shift systems as well as in ﬁ  lling technologies, 
one would expect that productivity is lower at the Danish plant. Hence, it is 
somewhat surprising that in fact the American plant used to have the lowest 
productivity among all AB plants, whereas the Danish plant under study 
ranked in the middle. This has, however, changed after the organizational 
changes in the U.S. plant that took place in spring 2003. In section 6.3.1, we 
will explain in more detail how this was accomplished.
6.3.1    Industrial  Relations
Industrial relations diﬀer vastly between the two locations. In the U.S. 
plant there are no trade unions and the general attitude of the management 
is rather to provide workers with beneﬁ  ts of one or the other type to keep 
the unions out. Furthermore, the factory is located in a state where union 
activity is considerably lower than the national average. At the Danish plant 
the situation is completely diﬀerent. Here workers are organized in strong 
unions and there is a long tradition of cooperating with the local union 
representative who is elected by the workers to represent them toward the 
management. This is a model that for many decades has worked well in many 
Danish ﬁ  rms. The model rests on the mutual trust (social capital) that has 
been built up over the years.
The diﬀerences in industrial relations1 are also reﬂ  ected in the organi-
1. The diﬀerences in span of control are likely not to be only due to diﬀerences in industrial 
relations, but also due to the fact that the skill level of the production workers at the U.S. plant 
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zational structure of the two plants.2 While the average span of control of 
managerial employees at the Danish plant varies between twenty-  four and 
thirty during years 2003 to 2007, the corresponding ﬁ  gures for the U.S. plant 
vary between ﬁ  ve and six. As the production technologies are basically the 
same, this naturally implies that the proportion of managerial employees is 
higher at the U.S. plant. This in turn means that the annual promotion rates 
from worker to managerial employee is substantially higher in the U.S. plant 
(2.4 to 3.5 percent) than in the Danish plant (0.3 to 0.4 percent).
As we know from the relational contracts literature (Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy 2002), when a relationship is built on reputation and trust, major 
changes are oftentimes diﬃcult and costly to implement.
6.3.2    The  Danish  Plant
The Danish plant has for many years had a reputation for paying high 
wages to their production workers—as much as 20 percent more than in 
other companies employing similar workers3—and for oﬀering good work-
ing conditions in general.4 As a consequence, it should have no problems 
in recruiting highly productive workers. However, a considerable portion 
of the workers have been hired as a result of being referred to by existing 
workers. In several cases the incumbents (the teams) actually chose new 
employees, or at least had a nontrivial inﬂ  uence on who was recruited. As 
a result, many workers knew each other before they became colleagues and 
were sometimes even family with each other. Of course, this meant that 
those who were employed were not necessarily always the best hires avail-
able and, moreover and probably more importantly, because the employees 
had strong ties to each other, their bargaining power toward their superiors 
was unusually strong.
Surprisingly, until recently nothing had been done to test workers before 
they were employed.5 In fact, testing was actually forbidden according to an 
agreement between the ﬁ  rm and the local trade union representatives. Many 
production workers have some form of postcompulsory vocational educa-
tion, or are skilled workers with apprenticeship training. As a result of the 
low worker turnover, the workforce at the plant typically has long tenures.
Nonproduction personnel are well paid too, but at competitive rates. Also 
for this category of employees the turnover rate is relatively low—on average 
2. See Smeets and Warzynski (2008) for a detailed analysis that also includes other AB plants 
than those in focus here.
3. Firm AB uses performance pay for most of its employees at the Danish plant. Production 
workers are the exception. Thus, all team members receive the same pay.
4. As one of the managerial employees told us, the wages are too high insofar that the demo-
tivated workers have no incentives to leave because of the large drop in earnings they would 
suﬀer. His estimate of the proportion of demotivated and poor employees locked in by the high 
wages was in the 5 to 10 percent range.
5. Buying peace at the Danish plant was very important for the top management of the ﬁ  rm. 
As one manager we interviewed expressed it: “every time there is the slightest (industrial rela-
tions) problem in this plant it will be discussed at the board level.”180    Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-  Nielsen
3 percent, annually—indicating that there are also other attractive features 
with the workplace than the compensation.
In general, the Danish labor market is not characterized by strong job 
security legislation. In fact, regulation of the termination of employment 
relationships is one of the most liberal in Europe and is at par with the 
United Kingdom and Switzerland. But at AB, employment protection is 
extensive and is an important part of the company’s personnel policies. 
Thus, if an employee does not ﬁ  t his or her present job, he or she is oﬀered 
another job within the ﬁ  rm and the ﬁ  rm pays for the training for the new job. 
If this does not work out either, the person can be laid oﬀ, but will typically 
receive help in the reallocation.
6.3.3    The  U.S.  Plant
In hiring workers the American plant has to compete with a number of 
other pharmaceutical plants in the nearby area, which is one of the major 
pharmaceutical clusters in the United States. As a result, they tend to recruit 
from the same pool of workers and wages are on par with those of the com-
peting ﬁ  rms. However, according to the plant’s HR-  manager the nonwage 
beneﬁ  ts are somewhat higher at AB’s U.S. plant than in the competing plants 
in the same region.
Average tenure for all employees is three years and the average age of all 
employees is 39.6. As can be seen from table 6.1, worker turnover was rather 
high in 1999 to 2000 but has decreased thereafter. At the time of the interview 
it was to land at 17 percent for the year 2004. Thus, the employee turnover 
rates at the U.S. plant are vastly higher than at the Danish plant. The earlier 
higher turnover should be seen in the perspective that the U.S. plant has only 
existed for twelve years. The increase in mobility in 2004 is chieﬂ  y among 
hourly paid workers and is probably due to some depreciation in compensa-
tion and working conditions. The reduction of employee turnover from 1999 
to 2002 was due to policies speciﬁ  cally aiming at retaining workers.
The predecessor of the current HR- manager had tried to implement self-
  managed teams that were principally designed in the same way as at the 
Danish plant. This organizational change turned out be a failure and was 
quickly abandoned. A management team member summarized these events 
by saying: “self-  managed teams are risky in regulated industries.” In order 
to reduce employee turnover, a new layer of supervisors, corresponding to 
the “team leaders” at the plant in Denmark, was recruited in 2003. There 
was also a change in the compensation program to include a bonus scheme, 
which contributed to a reduction in turnover. Another factor contributing 
Table 6.1   Employee turnover at the U.S. plant (in percent)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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to problems of retaining employees was that too many hires were ramped 
up at the same time, which led to lower average quality of the hires and 
consequently higher turnover.
Retaining employees in a highly competitive labor market like the phar-
maceutical cluster the AB plant is located in is, of course, a major challenge. 
The hourly paid workers at the U.S. plant are paid less in terms of base sal-
ary than workers at the major local competitors, but are on the other hand 
paid higher bonuses and are oﬀered more generous retirement beneﬁ  ts. A 
negative feature of working at AB’s American plant is that it is only closed 
for two days (Christmas and Thanksgiving) per year. This makes working 
there “like working at a hospital,” something that is not popular among the 
employees.
One of the elements in the compensation package that used to make the 
plant an attractive workplace was that annual paid time out (PTO)—forty 
hours per year—was also paid to hourly paid workers. However, this changed 
as of 2005. Now, PTO cannot be used anymore for reasons of bad weather, 
and in order to use PTO the employee has to notify the plant twelve hours 
in advance, otherwise the ﬁ  rst two hours are deducted from the attendance 
record in the following year. More important for retaining workers is the rel-
atively generous 401K Retirement Savings Program: the employer matches 
8 percent (gross) of the earnings and furthermore, matches 1 percent for the 
employee’s optional 2 percent contribution. This program is more generous 
than that of other ﬁ  rms in the local labor market and explains the success 
in retaining workers as it is likely to attract workers who consider staying in 
the industry during their entire labor market careers. A problem in attracting 
and retaining hourly paid workers is that there are relatively few promo-
tion possibilities6 for them. To improve on this, the earlier requirement that 
supervisors should have a college degree has been relaxed.
The U.S. plant’s HR-  manager complained about diﬃculties in recruiting 
enough qualiﬁ  ed workers. Training courses have been organized in collabo-
ration with the local community college and ﬁ  rms in the nearby pharma-
ceutical cluster in order to solve this problem.
The technicians, the supervisors, and the managers are all employed “at 
will,” which means that they can be ﬁ  red or laid oﬀ without notice, but to 
the best of our knowledge this has rarely happened.
6.4    Analysis—the  Main  Findings
6.4.1    Decision  to  Change
After a period of several years during which AB had been mainly focusing 
on the quality aspect of its production, increasing productivity and lowering 
6. There are three grade levels and a worker can advance to the highest grade in ﬁ  ve years’ 
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production costs became the new focal point. The shift in focus was launched 
as a reengineering project in the lean production tradition, which was started 
at both plants in 2003. The main emphasis was on improving the work pro-
cesses in order to enhance productivity. The motivation for starting this 
process in the ﬁ  lling process was that it was widely recognized that there was 
lots of idle time in the ﬁ  lling lines. It was conceived that one reason was that 
the “self-  managed teams” had largely been in charge of the time planning 
and time use, with poor utilization of time as a consequence.
With the lackluster productivity record in the U.S. plant, there is little 
doubt that the management in the plant felt strongly that they had to make a 
turnaround. As a consequence, a number of changes were initiated. First of 
all a new production manager was employed. He had experience of working 
for many years in the utilities industry and more recently at a major consul-
tancy ﬁ  rm. It was frequently pointed out to us that one of his “advantages” 
was that he had no previous experience of the pharmacy industry. This 
enabled him to take a fresh view of things and to take initiatives unseen in 
the industry before. He employed a number of new managers, including the 
current human resources manager.
Early on in the process, it was realized that one important element in a 
strategy to improve productivity was to change production to an around-
  the-  clock operation, as this would foster communication and continuity in 
operations. Earlier, the plant was using a multiple shifts system with eight-   
and twelve-  hour shift arrangements. As from early 2003, a standardized 
shifts system with twelve-  hour shifts only and a work schedule following a 
two- week repeating cycle was introduced. As a consequence of this change, 
the labor force had to be doubled. Because none among the existing work-
ers wanted to work on the night shift, two completely new teams had to be 
recruited. Ordinary workers were mainly recruited from the other pharma-
ceutical ﬁ  rms in the area and some were also employed directly from school 
(a 180 hours education preparing employees for work in the pharmaceutical 
industry provided by a local community college). The new employees were 
only hired for the night shift but they were promised to be moved to the day 
shift according to seniority and as vacancies opened up. There was a small 
wage premium of one dollar per hour for working at the night shift, but 
otherwise employment conditions were the same as for the day shift work-
ers. In late 2004, the night shift premium was increased to $2.50 per hour to 
reduce worker turnover.
Technicians were recruited among ex-  military personnel. The submari-
ners in particular proved to be good workers in the ﬁ  lling lines “because 
they were used to dealing with problems without calling for assistance.” 
Supervisors were also recruited among ex-  military oﬃcers, mainly those 
with a technical college education.
After a relatively short introduction and training at the community col-
lege, the two- shift, round- the- clock production started in 2003. The produc-Productivity Diﬀerences in an International Pharmaceutical Firm    1 8 3
tivity of the night shift fairly quickly reached levels comparable to those of 
the day shift. Together with the day shift, the U.S. plant was now producing 
at 50 percent of its capacity. It is believed that approximately 80 percent 
capacity utilization is the maximum, because of the FDA regulations, clean-
ing, and so forth.
The program for enhancing productivity also included changes in the 
organization of work at the ﬁ  lling lines. The aim was to simplify batch pro-
duction procedures in order to reduce the number of errors. Training of 
employees became more standardized and training programs were written 
down and hence became more formalized. In that sense one can say that 
the work organization got a more Taylorist ﬂ  avor than before. But some 
other changes went in the opposite direction. Thus, jobs typically became 
broader; for example, maintenance workers were now also expected to do 
ﬁ  lling work. This was not popular among the workers, but was nevertheless 
implemented by the management. The idea was to put more emphasis on 
preventive maintenance and to shorten the waiting time when a technician 
was needed. Another unpopular change was a shortening of breaks.
In order to support these changes and the LEAN program in general, 
the bonus program as from 2004 gives a bonus for LEAN participation and 
promotes cross- functional cooperation. Performance measurement is on the 
level of the individual worker, but performance bonuses accrue to teams. All 
the changes mentioned previously—in work organization, jobs, shifts, and 
remuneration—were controversial, and there was a lot of resistance that, 
as already noted, also took the form of an increase in workforce turnover. 
Thus, as predicted by theory (Lazear 2000), changes in compensation and 
work organization were accompanied by sorting of workers.
6.4.2    The  Change:  Diﬀerent Outcomes
As can be seen from ﬁ  gure 6.1, total production at the U.S. plant has 
increased steadily since production started. Employment has almost tripled 
since the ﬁ  rst years. Productivity has increased, too—see ﬁ  gure 6.2—but 
not uninterruptedly. In fact, productivity increased strongly during the ﬁ  rst 
years of operation, most likely as a consequence of the management gain-
ing more experience of running the plant and other employees of carrying 
out their tasks more eﬃciently. As from 2000, there is a considerable dip 
and productivity recovers slowly (and is higher only four years later). The 
dip in productivity coincides with the years of high labor turnover and the 
failure of organizing work in self- managed teams. The substantial improve-
ment after the implementation of the turnaround in 2003, which happened 
without an increase in the workforce, indicates that high worker turnover 
and team organization can be detrimental for productivity in this type of 
production.
We also have access to monthly data: for the U.S. plant for 2004 and 2005, 
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new production scheme was implemented in the very ﬁ  rst months of 2003, 
and so, the ﬁ  gures for 2003 are likely to be aﬀected by the management 
and workers (many of whom at the U.S. plant were newly hired) gaining 
experience from the new scheme. As can be seen from ﬁ  gures 6.3 and 6.4, 
production of both products at both plants displays considerable variation 
across months. Although not easily discernible from the ﬁ  gures, there is an 
increase in production over time.
As was discussed in section 6.3, productivity at the plants is determined by 
the up-  time of the equipment and the eﬃciency by which the equipment is 
operated. Somewhat surprisingly, comparable information about operating 
machine hours does not exist for both plants. Figure 6.5 gives the monthly 
availability of machines at the U.S. plant. From this it can clearly be seen 
Fig. 6.1  Development in employment and production at the U.S. plant, 1997–  2005
Fig. 6.2  The development of annual productivity at the U.S. plant, 1997–  2005Fig. 6.3  Total monthly production at the U.S. plant, 2004–  2005
Fig. 6.4  Total monthly production at the Danish plant, 2004–  2006186    Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-  Nielsen
that the total number of operating hours of the machines has been increas-
ing and has become much more stable over time.
Monthly data on labor productivity as measured by production per 
eﬀective working hours are available for 2004 to 2005 (both products) for 
the U.S. plant and 2005 to 2006 (2004 to 2006) for production of P1 (P2) 
at the Danish plant. These data are displayed in ﬁ  gures 6.6 and 6.7, which 
show very similar levels of productivity. As for changes, labor productivity 
has been ﬂ  at at the U.S. plant, whereas there is a weak positive growth at 
the Danish plant. Not too strong conclusions should be drawn from this 
as we do not have corresponding data from 2006 for the U.S. plant. With 
Fig. 6.5  Operating machine hours, U.S. plant, 2004 average  100
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this caveat in mind, it seems that the major accomplishment of the U.S. 
plant’s turnaround was an improvement in the maintenance and repair of 
the machinery (at least up to 2005). The group of new technicians employed 
and the reorganization of work have probably been key to the successful 
development at the U.S. plant.
Firm AB provided us with some scattered information on the handling 
and manning of the machines—the reasons for downtime at the U.S. and the 
Danish plant (see table 6.2). Unfortunately this is available for 2004 only and 
although we have tried our best to make the two statistics comparable, the 
comparison should be treated with due caution. The main reason for down-
time at the Danish plant is technical problems followed by “other reasons.” 
The HRM issues in the form of manning are considered to be substantially 
less important. Lack of manning is mainly due to sick absence and shortage 
of replacements. In the U.S. plant, “lack of supplies” is the most important 
cause of downtime and stops the production processes a number of times 
during the two month period covered by the statistics. Lack of personnel 
Fig. 6.7  Monthly productivity at the Danish plant, 2004–  2006
Table 6.2   Reasons for downtime in the Danish and the U.S. plant in 2004 
(in percent)
Reason  U.S. plant  Danish plant
Manning problems  8.2  23.5
Lack of supplies  11.8  29.0
Technical problems  64.6  14.5
Other reasons  15.4  31.0
Total 100  100188    Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-  Nielsen
is another major factor at the U.S. plant, whereas technical problems are 
unimportant. This accords with our conclusions regarding the U.S. plant.
The improvements in performance of the U.S. plant in general have clearly 
inﬂ  uenced the decision of the board of the AB to expand production at the 
plant. Thus, during the ﬁ  rst day of our visit at the plant our program had 
to be rescheduled due to the visit of the governor of the state, who made 
the announcement that there will be an expansion of the plant in the next 
few years, which will result in an increase of employment at the plant by a 
third by 2008.
Attempts to increase productivity were also made at the Danish plant, and 
as we have seen from ﬁ  gures 6.3 and 6.5, were met with some success. The 
goal here too was to increase actual production time (up-  time) at each line 
from the previous 7.1 hours per day to 17.7 hours within a four-  year time 
period. One central idea was to change the production into more shift work, 
similar to what had been done at the American plant. But it turned out to be 
much more diﬃcult to get through with such dramatic changes in working 
hours. The management simply found itself faced with the well- paid workers 
regarding current working hour schedules as a right they were not going to 
give up willingly. As work peace was a key feature of this “model employer” 
ﬁ  rm, the strategy was to avoid conﬂ  icts as far as possible. The main thing 
that came out of these eﬀorts was that workers at two ﬁ  lling lines are now 
working in a diﬀerent way “as an experiment.” In this experiment, new team 
leaders and new working schedules have been introduced.
The ﬁ  rst change at the Danish plant was to give the team leaders more 
decision rights than before and conversely, to take some of the authority 
from the self-  managed teams.7 New employees, all with a university degree, 
were hired into the positions as team leaders. One of the ﬁ  rst changes was the 
introduction of a new time schedule for the teams manning the two “experi-
mental” ﬁ  lling lines. Instead of the usual two eight- hour shifts with Saturday 
and Sundays free, a nine-  hour working day with two ﬁ  fteen-  minute breaks 
and one thirty-  ﬁ  ve-  minute break was adopted. Furthermore, unlike at the 
other lines, manning of the experimental lines is secured at all times. In 
many ways this means that the “right to manage” has been moved back to 
management. The authority of the teams is reduced considerably while the 
power of team leaders is strengthened. There are, however, also some costs 
associated with this transformation. Because the teams are not responsible 
anymore for the covering of sick-  days for the team members, absence from 
work becomes visible again and has to be dealt with (by team leaders).
The transformation process has been diﬃcult because workers did not 
7. It should be noted that also the other plants in Denmark originally had production work 
organized in self-  managed teams, but have abandoned the multitasking philosophy in recent 
years. For instance, this was the case in a relatively new plant that makes use of a new ﬁ  lling tech-
nology, which all the managers we talked with expected to be the next generation technology 
that will be adopted more widely in the industry. Self-  managed teams have not been adopted 
in the ﬁ  rm’s plants outside Denmark (except, as mentioned previously, at the U.S. plant where 
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want to abstain from what they considered to be well-  deserved privileges. 
Thus, the local union representatives have not cooperated in the introduc-
tion of the new system, and occasionally actively resisted it. (Thus, there 
were even short strikes among production workers, which have not taken 
place in many years.) On the other hand, national level unions have provided 
some support in facilitating the changes. Help from lawyers specializing in 
labor relations has been instrumental in accomplishing even small changes. 
In addition to changes in time schedules and decision rights, another nov-
elty is performance management meetings in order to focus on productivity 
improvements, development of standards for batch shifts, shortening of idle 
time, and increasing monitoring.
During our one-  hour visit inside the plant, we observed a number of 
interruptions in ﬁ  lling, and it is obvious that the process of ﬁ  lling is critical 
for increasing up-  time and improving productivity. On the technical front, 
a new ﬁ  ller line was introduced in June 2004. The ﬁ  ller line uses a superior 
technology and is twice as fast as the old ones. The new line can be consid-
ered as an implicit threat of job losses at other lines if their productivity is 
not improved. Still another threat facing the workers at the plant in Den-
mark is the company’s plans to start up new production and expand current 
production sites abroad, including those in low- wage countries. Clearly, the 
likelihood of substitution of jobs from the Danish plant to other countries 
has created some additional pressure on the workers to accept management’s 
plans for changes.
Next we brieﬂ  y consider another Danish plant mentioned in the introduc-
tion to section 6.3. The main reason is that we were not, despite considerable 
eﬀorts, able to obtain comparable data from our Danish main case plant, 
and therefore wanted to look at developments at this other plant as a kind 
of robustness check. Technologically the second Danish plant is identical 
to the U.S. plant; both produce products P1 and P2 and unlike the Danish 
main case plant, they do not do trial ﬁ  llings (i.e., short batches). The month-
  to-  month variations in production are also large at this Danish plant and 
production has increased in the period from 2004 to 2006.
It should be noted that some of the problems encountered in implement-
ing the LEAN project at the main case plant were not present at this sec-
ond plant. In particular, the resistance to the changes associated with the 
LEAN project was substantially weaker. Consequently, we would expect to 
observe a stronger improvement in productivity here. Unfortunately we do 
not have access to monthly series for the old product (P1) for 2004. But as 
can be seen from ﬁ  gure 6.8, the productivity development in 2005 and 2006 
for this product shows no signs of improvement and does not lend support 
to our expectations of superior productivity performance here (compared 
to the other Danish plant). On the other hand, there is a strong increase in 
productivity for P2. However, this is most likely due to learning curve eﬀects, 
as we are here observing production of a new product. Curiously enough, 
there were no signs of a similar learning eﬀect at the U.S. plant.190    Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-  Nielsen
6.5    Summary  and  Conclusions
The Danish and the American plants are more or less identical with respect 
to technology, product, IT, and also largely regarding overall management 
style. Firm AB has throughout the entire ﬁ  rm a labor-  friendly approach to 
HRM with a strong emphasis on training, a relatively high level of nonwage 
beneﬁ  ts, and considerable promotion possibilities (especially for nonpro-
duction workers) within the ﬁ  rm. It has strong values with respect to equal 
opportunities and so forth. However, there are also a number of diﬀerences 
between the two plants due to the diﬀerent environments of operation. One 
diﬀerence is that workers at the Danish plant are paid higher than market 
wages, whereas at the American plant compensation is the competitive wage. 
The educational level of workers is another diﬀerence. This is considerably 
higher at the Danish plant. Management at the U.S. plant uses a lot of 
resources to keep trade unions out, while at the Danish plant resources have, 
at least until recently, been spent on cooperation and dealing with the local 
trade unions, which at times have acted quite militantly in resisting changes. 
The management structures are about the same down to the level of team 
leader. Both plants used to have self-  managed teams, but these have been 
abandoned in the U.S. plant and in the Danish plant management is trying 
to disempower the teams. The main diﬀerence seems to be in how the change 
has been implemented at the two plants.
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The management at the U.S. plant was able to take back the right to 
manage quite swiftly, and was also able to introduce a new shift system and 
to hire and train completely new teams. The changes in work organizations 
and in job design were met with considerable resistance. Although the U.S. 
plant is a nonunion workplace, it had (according to its management) many 
features in common with unionized workplaces because it used to be orga-
nized as “silos;” that is, in departments with very little interaction. Therefore, 
absence of organized labor is not necessarily the sole explanation for why the 
transformation of the U.S. workplace was more successful than the Danish 
one. The recruitment was the major diﬃculty in this process because of the 
shortage of skilled workers.
At the Danish plant the major problem seems to be to get workers—and 
the local trade union in particular—to accept the proposed changes in the 
right to manage. As a result, changes have been introduced gradually and 
slowly and had to be implemented as an experiment. Why does it appear to 
be a greater challenge to change the organizational culture at the Danish 
plant? The presence of quite militant local union representatives is most 
certainly part of the story. Another factor that presumably has had some 
inﬂ  uence is that this is a much older plant with an organizational culture, 
the roots of which therefore go deeper. Originally the American plant had 
the same company policy as the mother company, but these policies stood 
out as quite diﬀerent from the normal U.S. practices, while the diﬀerences 
in Denmark were smaller.
Still another contributing factor is how the change was designed; espe-
cially the absence of positive economic incentives that would make accep-
tance of the changes easier is a major diﬀerence as compared the U.S. plant. 
On the other hand, the Danish plant was already paying considerably higher 
wages than their local competitors, which clearly put some restrictions on 
this option. Hence, the incentives were more of the threat of job loss type. 
To which extent these implicit threats were conceived of as credible is hard to 
tell; one circumstance speaking in favor of that they were not, is the fact the 
plant is at the headquarters of the ﬁ  rm and that some of the operations in 
the ﬁ  rm are only carried out at the Danish plant and, therefore, are expected 
to remain there.
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